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MUNICIPAL LIABILITY: DERIVATIVE OR DIRECT?
STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL?
DISTINGUISHING THE CANTON CASE
FROM THE COLLINS CASE
Karen M. Blum*
INTRODUCTION
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Monell v. Department of So-
cial Services,' holding that local government entities may be sued
under § 19832 for official policies or customs that cause constitutional
violations,3 the Supreme Court, as well as lower federal courts, have
been engaged in developing a "highly complex body of interpretive
law ' 4 to effectuate the distinction adopted in Moneil between direct
and vicarious liability . The line becomes particularly difficult to draw
* Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. I would like to thank Dean John E.
Fenton, Jr. for his generous support of my scholarship through the summer writing stipend. My
appreciation is also extended to Barbara Wennger for her very capable research assistance.
1. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The Court overruled Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), to the
extent it had held that municipalities were not "persons" subject to suit within the meaning of
the term in §1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 663.
2. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial of-
ficer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief
shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclu-
sively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
3. See Monel, 436 U.S. at 690-94.
4. Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 430 (1997) (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens
and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
5. The Court in Monell rejected the concept of respondeat superior liability against municipal-
ities under § 1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. This author was among those who first criticized the
rejection of respondeat superior liability in Monell. See Karen M. Blum, From Monroe to Mo-
nelL' Defining the Scope of Municipal Liability in Federal Courts, 51 TEMPLE L.Q. 409 (1978),
cited in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 489 n.4 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment). In Brown, Justice Breyer authored a dissenting opinion in
which he called for a reexamination of "the legal soundness of [the] basic distinction" drawn in
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when liability against the municipality is premised on action or inac-
tion that itself may not be unconstitutional, such as failure to ade-
quately screen, train, supervise, or discipline non-policymaking
employees who do commit constitutional violations. Arguments made
by litigants and opinions rendered by judges still reflect considerable
confusion as to the difference between assertions of municipal liability
based on a derivative/statutory notion stemming from the Supreme
Court's decision in City of Canton v. Harris,6 and from allegations at-
tempting to establish municipal liability for direct/constitutional viola-
tions based on the reasoning of the Court in Collins v. City of Harker
Heights.7 This Symposium took place before the Supreme Court ren-
dered its decision in County of Sacramento v. Lewis,8 holding that, in
the context of a high speed pursuit, only conduct on the part of the
individual officer that is intended to cause harm and that is without
any law enforcement justification is sufficient to "shock the con-
science" and, thus, is actionable as a substantive due process claim
under the Fourteenth Amendment. While Lewis is not a case about
government liability, this author believes the opinion may provide an
answer to the "Where's the beef?" problem raised in cases finding
municipal liability for deliberate indifference without an underlying
constitutional violation by the individual officer involved. Indeed,
although Lewis is generally regarded as a disaster by plaintiffs' attor-
neys engaged in § 1983 litigation,9 the case contains the seeds for justi-
fying a finding of municipal liability in some substantive due process
cases where the officer's conduct does not rise (or sink) to a con-
science-shocking level.
THE CONCEPT OF DERIVATIVE OR STATUTORY LIABILITY UNDER
SECTION 1983
In City of Canton v. Harris,10 the Court addressed the question of
whether a municipality could ever be liable under § 1983 for constitu-
tional violations resulting from a failure to train municipal employ-
ees.' The plaintiff in Canton had been arrested and brought to the
Monell between direct and vicarious liability. 520 U.S. at 430 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens and
Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
6. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
7. 503 U.S. 115 (1992).
8. 118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998).
9. This is the author's own observation, derived from conversations with many plaintiffs' at-
torneys throughout the country in a period shortly following the Lewis decision.
10. 489 U.S. 378.
11. Id. at 380.
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police station in a patrol wagon.12 Upon arrival at the station, she was
incoherent when asked about her need for medical assistance. 13 After
she fell to the floor twice, she was left on the floor with no medical
help. 14 After approximately one hour, she was released to her family
and transported to a hospital where she was diagnosed as suffering
from a number of emotional ailments.15 She remained in the hospital
for a week and received outpatient treatment throughout the follow-
ing year. 16
Mrs. Harris brought suit under § 1983, claiming a deprivation of her
substantive due process right to receive necessary medical care while
in police custody. 17 She asserted a claim of municipal liability for this
deprivation based on a theory of "grossly inadequate training."'18 The
plaintiff presented evidence of a municipal regulation, establishing a
policy of giving police shift commanders complete discretion to make
decisions as to whether prisoners were in need of medical care, ac-
companied by evidence that such commanders received no training or
guidelines to assist in making such judgments. 19 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the adequacy of the
district court's jury instructions on the issue of municipal liability for
inadequate training, stating that the plaintiff could succeed on her
claim of municipal liability for failure to train its police force, "[where]
the plaintiff ... prove[s] that the municipality acted recklessly, inten-
tionally, or with gross negligence."'20
In an opinion written by Justice White, the Court unanimously re-
jected the argument of the City that municipal liability can be imposed
only where the challenged policy is unconstitutional and concluded
that "there are limited circumstances in which an allegation of a 'fail-
ure to train' can be the basis for liability under § 1983."21 Noting the
substantial disagreement among the lower courts as to the level of
culpability required in failure-to-train cases, the Court went on to hold
that "the inadequacy of [the training policy] may serve as the basis for
§ 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into
12. Id. at 381.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Harris, 489 U.S. at 381.
18. Id. at 382.
19. Id. at 381-82.
20. Id. at 382.
21. Id. at 387.
1999]
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contact. ' 22 The Court was careful to note that the "deliberate indif-
ference" 23 standard it was imposing as a matter of statutory construc-
tion under § 1983 has nothing to do with the level of culpability that
may be required to make out the underlying constitutional wrong, but
rather has to do with what is required to establish the municipal policy
as the "moving force" 24 behind the constitutional violation.25 The
Court did not address the question of whether there was an underly-
ing constitutional violation under substantive due process on the part
of the city employees in denying medical care to Mrs. Harris. Given
the state of the record before the Supreme Court, it was "assume[d]
that respondent's constitutional right to receive medical care was de-
nied by city employees-whatever the nature of that right might
be."' 26 The issue was whether the given violation could be attributed
to the City for liability purposes under § 1983.27
Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, suggested that a plain-
tiff could establish deliberate indifference on the part of a municipality
where failure to train, in the face of an obvious need for training, was
substantially certain to result in constitutional injuries. 28 Where there
is "a clear constitutional duty implicated in recurrent situations that a
particular employee is certain to face .... failure to inform city person-
nel of that duty will create an extremely high risk that constitutional
violations will ensue. '29 For example, all of the Justices agreed that a
failure of a city to train police officers as to the constitutional limita-
tions on the use of deadly force,30 would be so certain to result in
constitutional violations, that such a failure to train would reflect the
"deliberate indifference" to constitutional rights required for the im-
position of municipal liability. 31
Justice O'Connor also recognized that municipal liability on a "fail-
ure to train" theory might be established:
22. Id. at 388.
23. Harris, 489 U.S. at 388 n.8.
24. Id. at 389.
25. Note that while the Court has held that § 1983 contains no state-of-mind requirement,
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 534 (1981), Harris does establish a deliberate indifference state-
of-mind requirement as an essential element of failure-to-train claims, mandated not by the un-
derlying constitutional violation, but by the "causation" language of § 1983. Harris, 489 U.S. at
389.
26. Id. at 388 n.8.
27. Id. at 380.
28. Id. at 396. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
29. Id.
30. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1975).
31. Harris, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10.
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[W]here it can be shown that policymakers were aware of, and ac-
quiesced in, a pattern of constitutional violations involving the exer-
cise of police discretion, . . . [which pattern] could put the
municipality on notice that its officers confront the particular situa-
tion on a regular basis, and that they often react in a manner con-
trary to constitutional requirements. 32
Thus, Canton provides a plaintiff with two different approaches to a
failure-to-train case. First, a plaintiff may claim that her constitutional
injury was caused by the municipality's failure to train in an area
where there was an obvious need for training in order to prevent of-
ficers or employees from violating citizens' constitutional rights.
33
Second, a plaintiff may rely on a pattern of unconstitutional conduct
so pervasive as to imply actual or constructive knowledge of the con-
duct on the part of policymakers, whose deliberate indifference to the
unconstitutional practice, evidenced by a failure to correct, would be
attributable to the municipality. 34
32. Id. at 397 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
33. See, e.g., Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837 (10th Cir. 1997):
When read as a whole and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the
party opposing summary judgment, the record supports an inference that the City
trained its officers to leave cover and approach armed suicidal, emotionally disturbed
persons and to try to disarm them, a practice contrary to proper police procedures and
tactical principles .... The evidence is sufficient to support an inference that the need
for different training was so obvious and the inadequacy so likely to result in violation
of constitutional rights that the policymakers of the City could reasonably be said to
have been deliberately indifferent to the need.
Id. at 843-44; Zuchel v. City and County of Denver, 997 F.2d 730, 741 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding
evidence clearly sufficient to permit jury reasonably to infer that Denver's failure to implement
recommended periodic live "shoot-don't shoot" range training constituted deliberate indiffer-
ence to the constitutional rights of Denver citizens); Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473,
1483 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Mason County's failure to train its officers in the legal limits of the use of
force constituted 'deliberate indifference' to the safety of its inhabitants as a matter of law.").
34. See, e.g., Henry v. County of Shasta, 132 F.3d 512 (9th Cir. 1997), amended on denial of
reh'g, 137 F.3d 1372 (9th Cir. 1998):
If a municipal defendant's failure to fire or reprimand officers evidences a policy of
deliberate indifference to their misconduct, surely its failure even after being sued to
correct a blatantly unconstitutional course of treatment- stripping persons who have
committed minor traffic infractions, throwing them naked into a 'rubber room' and
holding them there for ten hours or more for failing to sign a traffic ticket or asserting
their legal right to be brought before a magistrate-is even more persuasive evidence
of deliberate indifference or of a policy encouraging such official misconduct.
Id. at 520; Vann v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1040, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995) ("An obvious need [for
more or better supervision] may be demonstrated through proof of repeated complaints of civil
rights violations; deliberate indifference may be inferred if the complaints are followed by no
meaningful attempt on the part of the municipality to investigate or to forestall further inci-
dents."); Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1994):
Where the city equips its police officers with potentially dangerous animals, and evi-
dence is adduced that those animals inflict injury in a significant percentage of the cases
in which they are used, a failure to adopt a departmental policy governing their use, or
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In a typical Canton "failure to train" case, there are two hurdles a
plaintiff must overcome. First, a plaintiff must show an underlying
constitutional violation has been committed by someone acting under
color of law, generally a nonpolicymaking employee of the local gov-
ernment unit. 35 Second, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the munici-
pality "caused" the underlying constitutional violation within the
meaning of § 1983 and, thus, is responsible for the harm incurred by
plaintiff.36 The requisite causal link between the constitutional injury
and the municipal policy is established by proving that the city's pol-
icy, even if constitutional, was deliberately indifferent to the violation
of citizens' constitutional rights by municipal employees. Liability of
the government entity under Canton is derivative and dependent upon
first establishing a constitutional violation by a nonpolicymaking
employee.
In Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown,37
the Supreme Court revisited the issue of municipal liability under
§ 1983 in the context of a single bad-hiring decision made by a county
sheriff who was stipulated to be the final policymaker for the county
in matters of law enforcement. The plaintiff was injured when she was
forcibly extracted from a vehicle driven by her husband. 38 Mr. Brown
was avoiding a police checkpoint and was eventually stopped by a
squad car in which Reserve Deputy Burns was riding.39 Burns re-
moved Mrs. Brown from the vehicle with such force that he caused
to implement rules or regulations regarding the constitutional limits of that use, evi-
dences a 'deliberate indifference' to constitutional rights.
Id. at 1445; Cox v. District of Columbia, 821 F. Supp. 1, 13 (D.D.C. 1993) ("[T]he District of
Columbia's maintenance of a patently inadequate system of investigation of excessive force com-
plaints constitutes a custom or practice of deliberate indifference to the rights of persons who
come in contact with District police officers.").
35. See, e.g., Estate of Phillips v. City of Milwaukee, 128 F.3d 586, 597 (7th Cir. 1997)
("Neither the City nor the police officers' supervisor can be held liable on a failure to train
theory or on a municipal policy theory absent a finding that the individual police officers are
liable on the underlying substantive claim."); Abbott v. City of Crocker, 30 F.3d 994, 998 (8th
Cir. 1994) ("The City cannot be liable in connection with either the excessive force claim or the
invalid arrest claim, whether on a failure to train theory or a municipal custom or policy theory,
unless Officer Stone is found liable on the underlying substantive claim."); see also Sanchez v.
Figueroa, 996 F. Supp. 143, 147 (D.P.R. 1998) (holding that in an action against a supervisory
official for failure to train and failure to screen/supervise, the plaintiff must first establish that a
non-supervisory officer violated the plaintiffs' decedent's constitutional rights).
36. See, e.g., Wyke v. Polk County Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560, 568-69 (11th Cir. 1997) ("[T]o pre-
vail on a § 1983 claim against a local government entity, a plaintiff must prove both that her
harm was caused by a constitutional violation and that the government entity is responsible for
that violation.").
37. 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
38. Brown v. Bryan County, 67 F.3d 1174, 1177-78 (5th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
39. Id.
[Vol. 48:687
1999] FROM CANTON TO COLLINS
severe injury to her knees.40 The plaintiff sued both Burns and the
County under § 1983.41 A panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's entry of judgment on the jury's verdict against Burns for
excessive force, false arrest, and false imprisonment.42 The majority
of the panel also affirmed the judgment against the county based on
the single decision of Sheriff Moore to hire Burns without adequately
investigating his background. 43 The Fifth Circuit concluded that
Moore's inadequate screening and hiring of Burns demonstrated "de-
liberate indifference to the public's welfare. '44
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four opinion written by Justice
O'Connor, reversed the court of appeals, distinguishing Brown's case,
involving a claim that a single lawful hiring decision ultimately re-
sulted in a constitutional violation, from a case where the plaintiff
claims that "a particular municipal action itself violates federal law, or
directs an employee to do so. ''45 As the Court noted, its prior cases
recognizing municipal liability based on a single act or decision attrib-
uted to the government entity involved decisions of local legislative
bodies or policymakers that directly effected or ordered someone to
effect a constitutional deprivation. 46
40. Id. at 1178.
41. Id. at 1177.
42. Id. at 1185.
43. Id.
44. Brown, 67 F.3d at 1185. Burns, the son of Sheriff Moore's nephew, had an extensive "rap
sheet," but the numerous violations and arrests included no felonies. Id. at 1183. State law
prohibited the Sheriff's hiring of an individual convicted of a felony, but did not proscribe the
hiring of someone like Burns. Id. Although the original district court opinion entered a judg-
ment on the jury's verdict for the plaintiff on both an inadequate hiring claim and an inadequate
training claim, the Court of Appeals did not address the inadequate training claim. See id. at
1178. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit, in turn, remanded the case to the
district court "for consideration in conformity with the opinion of the Supreme Court." Brown
v. Bryan County, 117 F.3d 239 (5th Cir. 1997). The district court found "sufficient evidence to
support the jury's verdict imposing Section 1983 liability against Bryan County for its inadequate
training of Burns .... " Brown v. Bryan County, No. 4:91 CV 229, slip op. at 6, 7 (E.D. Tex. June
22, 1998). As this Article is being written, Brown 11 is on appeal before the Fifth Circuit.
45. Brown v. Board of County Comm'rs, 520 U.S. 397, 404-05 (1997).
46. See, e.g., Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (finding that the county prose-
cutor gave order that resulted in constitutional violation); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,
453 U.S. 247 (1981) (finding the decision of city council to cancel license permitting concert
directly violated constitutional rights); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (hold-
ing city council discharged employee without due process). In such cases, there are no real
problems with respect to the issues of fault or causation. See Bennett v. Pippin, 74 F.3d 578 (5th
Cir. 1996), where the county was held liable for the Sheriff's rape of a murder suspect, when the
Sheriff was the final policymaker in matters of law enforcement. Id. at 586 n.5.
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The majority rejected the plaintiff's effort to analogize her inade-
quate screening case to a failure-to-train case. 47 Justice O'Connor
noted:
In attempting to import the reasoning of Canton into the hiring con-
text, respondent ignores the fact that predicting the consequence of
a single hiring decision, even one based on an inadequate assess-
ment of a record, is far more difficult than predicting what might
flow from the failure to train a single law enforcement officer as to a
specific skill necessary to the discharge of his duties. As our deci-
sion in Canton makes clear, 'deliberate indifference' is a stringent
standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded
a known or obvious consequence of his action. Unlike the risk from
a particular glaring omission in a training regimen, the risk from a
single instance of inadequate screening of an applicant's back-
ground is not 'obvious' in the abstract; rather, it depends upon the
background of the applicant. A lack of scrutiny may increase the
likelihood that an unfit officer will be hired, and that the unfit of-
ficer will, when placed in a particular position to affect the rights of
citizens, act improperly. But that is only a generalized showing of
risk. The fact that inadequate scrutiny of an applicant's background
would make a violation of rights more likely cannot alone give rise
to an inference that a policymaker's failure to scrutinize the record
of a particular applicant produced a specific constitutional
violation.48
The majority opinion concluded that:
Only where adequate scrutiny of an applicant's background would
lead a reasonable policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious
consequence of the decision to hire the applicant would be the dep-
rivation of a third party's federally protected right can the official's
failure to adequately scrutinize the applicant's background consti-
tute 'deliberate indifference.' 49
Thus, the majority insisted on evidence from which a jury could find
that had Sheriff Moore adequately screened Deputy Burns' back-
ground, he "should have concluded that Burns' use of excessive force
would be a plainly obvious consequence of the hiring decision." 50 In
the view of the majority, scrutiny of Burns' record produced insuffi-
cient evidence from which a jury could have found that Sheriff
Moore's hiring decision reflected deliberate indifference to an obvious
risk that Burns would use excessive force.51
47. Brown, 520 U.S. at 409.
48. Id. at 410-11.
49. Id. at 411.
50. Id. at 412-13.
51. Id. at 413. Justice Souter, joined by Justices Breyer and Stevens, dissented in Brown, char-
acterizing the majority opinion as an expression of "deep skepticism" that "converts a newly-
demanding formulation of the standard of fault into a virtually categorical impossibility of show-
[Vol. 48:687
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In Brown, as in Canton, there was no question about the underlying
constitutional violation that had been committed by the non-poli-
cymaking employee. In both cases, the Court was engaged in defining
the level of culpability that plaintiffs would have to prove to demon-
strate municipal liability under § 1983 for having "caused" the viola-
tion. While both a failure-to-train case and a failure-to-screen case
require a showing of "deliberate indifference," the plaintiff's burden
in the inadequate screening case is more stringent and is more depen-
dent upon the specific background of the particular employee and the
type of constitutional injury incurred. 52
THE CONCEPT OF DIRECT MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION
Unlike Canton and Brown, the issue before the Court in Collins v.
City of Harker Heights53 was not municipal responsibility for an of-
ficer's unconstitutional conduct. Instead, the issue in the case was
ing it in a case like this." Id. at 421 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens and Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Stevens, authored a dissent which calls for a
reexamination of "the legal soundness of th[e] basic distinction" adopted in Monell between
direct and vicarious municipal liability. Id. at 430-31. (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens and Gins-
burg, JJ., dissenting).
52. In Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1998), a post-Brown case, the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit explained the exacting nature of the "deliberate indifference"
standard when it is applied in a failure-to-screen case:
Culpability requires a strong connection between the background of the particular ap-
plicant and the specific constitutional violation alleged .... We note that the focus of
the inquiry in determining when a single poor hiring decision is sufficient to constitute
deliberate indifference appears to be on the actual background of the individual appli-
cant and not on the thoroughness or adequacy of the municipality's review of the appli-
cation itself .... Whether or not an unsuitable applicant is ultimately hired depends
more on his actual history than the actions or inactions of the municipality.
Id. at 1308 & n.7, 1309; see Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 797 (5th Cir. 1998) ("Trepagnier
had admitted to two nonviolent offenses: stealing a jacket and smoking marijuana. On this evi-
dence, Snyder's claim that the city's screening policies were inadequate fails the Bryan County
test: that the plaintiff's injury be the 'plainly obvious consequence' of the hiring decision."), cert.
granted, 119 S. Ct. 863 (1999); Doe v. Granbury ISD, 19 F. Supp. 2d 667, 676 n.4 (N.D. Tex. 1998)
("Although plaintiffs present evidence that [teacher] sexually abused students in Mansfield, they
present no evidence that a background check of [teacher] would have revealed such conduct.").
But see Kessler v. King, 29 F. Supp. 2d 356, 369 (S.D. Tex. 1998) ("[T]he decision to 'recommend'
the hiring of Lieutenant Wallace, a former Texas Department of Corrections officer who had
actually been convicted of beating an inmate in violation of his civil rights, carried a substantial
risk that some inmate's right to be free from excessive force would be violated."); Doe I v. Board
of Educ. of Consol. Sch. Dist. 230, 18 F. Supp. 2d 954, 961 (N.D. I1. 1998) ("[I]f plaintiffs can
prove that upon proper inquiry the District could have discovered that [the teacher] had abused
[the former student], it may be able to establish that his abuse of plaintiffs would have been a
plainly obvious consequence of the hiring decision.").
53. 503 U.S. 115 (1992).
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whether a constitutional violation had occurred at all.54 In Collins, the
wife of a sanitation department worker brought suit against the city of
Harker Heights after her husband was asphyxiated while working on a
sewer line.5 5 Mrs. Collins alleged that the city had violated her hus-
band's substantive due process rights through a policy of deliberate
indifference to the rights of city employees. 56 Specifically, Mrs. Col-
lins alleged that the city had a policy of failing to provide training to
its employees regarding the risks of working in sewer lines, failing to
provide safety equipment, and failing to provide safety warnings. 57
The district court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint for failure to state
a claim, finding no constitutional violation was alleged. 58 The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, but on the ground that the
plaintiff had not alleged an abuse of governmental power, a prerequi-
site for a § 1983 claim.59
A unanimous Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's require-
ment that the plaintiff must offer proof of an abuse of governmental
power that is separate from proof of a constitutional violation. 60 In-
stead, the proper standard for finding municipal liability under § 1983
requires the plaintiff to show that her harm was caused by a constitu-
tional violation and that the city is responsible for that violation.61
The Court noted that the plaintiff's reliance on Canton was based on
the misapprehension that Canton was a decision dealing with the con-
stitutional issue. As the Court pointed out, however, Canton dealt
only with the question of whether the assumed underlying constitu-
tional violation could be attributed to the municipality. 62 In Collins,
the Court assumed, for purposes of the decision, that the plaintiff suf-
54. Id. at 122-23.
55. Id. at 117.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Collins, 503 U.S. at 118.
60. Id. at 119. The Court noted that the mere fact that a government employee initiated the
action, rather than a private citizen, was not a dispositive factor. Justice Stevens, writing for the
Court, made it clear that:
The First Amendment, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and other provisions of the Federal Constitution afford protection
to employees who serve the government as well as to those who are served by them,
and § 1983 provides a cause of action for all citizens injured by an abridgement of those
protections.
Id. at 119-20.
61. Id. at 120.
62. Id. at 122-23. As the Court explained:
Although the term 'deliberate indifference' has been used in other contexts to define
the threshold for finding a violation of the Eighth Amendment, . . . as we have ex-
plained, that term was used in the Canton case for the quite different purpose of identi-
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ficiently alleged that the city was responsible for the harm to Collins
based on a theory other than respondeat superior liability. 63
Turning to the issue of whether unconstitutional conduct occurred,
the Supreme Court proceeded cautiously in determining the specific
substantive due process right that Mrs. Collins alleged the city vio-
lated.64 The Court interpreted the complaint as advancing two theo-
ries of municipal liability: (1) The government had a constitutional
duty to provide workers with a minimally safe work environment, or
(2) the City's deliberate indifference to the safety of its workers was
arbitrary government conduct that was conscience-shocking. 65 The
Court considered the first theory of liability "unprecedented," distin-
guishing the case from instances where the government deprives per-
sons of their liberty to act for themselves, and thus owes a duty to
provide for the safety and welfare of those who are involuntarily in
custody.66 Because the city had not deprived Mr. Collins of his lib-
erty, the Court concluded that the city owed no constitutional duty to
provide safe working conditions to Mr. Collins.67
fying the threshold for holding a city responsible for the constitutional torts committed
by its inadequately trained agents.
Id. at 124.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 125 (recognizing the Court's hesitation in expanding substantive due process rights).
65. Collins, 503 U.S. at 126.
66. Id. at 127-28 (recognizing the State has a duty to provide for persons in custody).
67. Id. at 129-30; see Wallace v. Adkins, 115 F.3d 427 (7th Cir. 1997):
[U]nlike a prisoner, a person involuntarily committed to a mental institution, or a child
placed by state authorities in a foster home, Wallace was free to walk out the door any
time he wanted.... We therefore hold that prison guards ordered to stay at their posts
are not in the kind of custodial setting required to create a special relationship for 14th
Amendment substantive due process purposes.
Id. at 430; Liebson v. New Mexico Corrections Dep't, 73 F.3d 274, 276 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding
that where a librarian was assigned to provide library services to inmates housed in maximum
security unit of the New Mexico State Penitentiary she was not in state's custody or held against
her will; employment relationship was "completely voluntary"); Skinner v. City of Miami, 62
F.3d 344 (11th Cir. 1995). Deciding a case involving hazing incident by firefighters, the court
determined:
[The] record does not support the dissent's implication that the City committed any
deliberate acts to injure [plaintiff]. At most, the evidence suggests that certain fire
department officials knew that hazing incidents had occurred at some points in the past.
This, however, falls short of demonstrating that the City violated a substantive constitu-
tional right.
Id. at 347 n.2; Lewellen v. Metropolitan Gov't, 34 F.3d 345 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding a workman
accidentally injured on school construction project has no substantive due process claim); Figue-
roa v. United States, 7 F.3d 1405 (9th Cir. 1993):
[W]hile we acknowledge that a broader understanding of deprivation of liberty may
have emerged later ... in 1987 there was no clearly established constitutional right not
to be placed in a position of danger by a government employer absent some sort of
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In addition, the Supreme Court held that the city's failure to train
or warn its employees about known risks of harm did not rise to the
level of arbitrary or conscious-shocking behavior.68 In making this de-
termination, the Supreme Court reinforced the position it had previ-
ously articulated, that it would not read traditional duties imposed by
state tort law into the Due Process Clause. 69 Although the Court as-
sumed that the city had a duty under Texas law to warn employees of
dangers and to provide education and training, the city's failure to do
so was not arbitrary in a constitutional sense.70 Consequently, the
Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.71
CITY OF Los ANGELES v. HELLER
In City of Los Angeles v. Heller,72 the Supreme Court considered
whether a municipality could be held liable for the conduct of one of
its officers in an excessive force case in which the officer was exoner-
ated by the jury. 73 Heller brought suit against the City of Los Angeles
and individual police officers, alleging that the police officers violated
his constitutional rights by arresting him without probable cause and
by using excessive force in the course of the arrest.74 During the
governmental restriction on an individual's physical freedom to act to avert potential
harm.
Id. at 1413; Walls v. City of Detroit, 993 F.2d 1548, 1993 WL 158498 (6th Cir. 1993) (Table, Text
in Westlaw):
[P]laintiff's artful attempt to recast his complaint in terms distinguishable from City of
Harker Heights is unavailing, because it misunderstands one of the central tenets of the
Supreme Court's holding in that case: the Constitution does not guarantee police of-
ficers and other municipal employees a workplace free of unreasonable risks of harm.
Id. at *5. But see Jensen v. City of Oxnard, 145 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1998):
Employing Collins, Oxnard argues that Officer Jensen could not have had any of his
rights violated because he was injured while performing his duties as a police officer.
We reject this argument and Oxnard's attempt to turn this into a safe workplace case.
Although this case is similar to the safe workplace cases in that they both concern
individuals who 'voluntarily accepted.., an offer of employment,'.. . this case is differ-
ent in one significant way-the nature of the injury alleged .... While the safe work-
place cases concern the failure of the state adequately to train, prepare, or protect
government employees from non-state actors, this case involves the allegedly inten-
tional or reckless acts of a government employee directed against another government
employee.
Id. at 1083-84.
68. Collins, 503 U.S. at 128. The Court noted that the plaintiff had not alleged wilfulness or
deliberate harm or that the supervisor knew or should have known of the significant risk. Id. at
125.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 129.
71. Id. at 130.
72. 475 U.S. 796 (1986).
73. Id. at 799.
74. Id. at 797.
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arrest, one of the officers employed a chokehold to restrain Heller and
a struggle ensued, which resulted in Heller falling through a plate
glass window. 75 The City of Los Angeles Police Department's alleged
custom of condoning the use of excessive force served as the basis for
Heller's claim against the city. 76
The district court judge bifurcated the trial, so that the first phase
proceeded against Officer Bushey on the excessive force claim. 77 The
jury, which received no instruction on any affirmative defense of qual-
ified immunity78 or good faith, rendered a general verdict in favor of
the officer.79 Consequently, the District Court dismissed the remain-
ing claims against the city, reasoning that without an underlying con-
stitutional violation by the individual officer, there could be no
municipal liability.80
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal
of the claims against the city on the basis that the jury might have
concluded that Officer Bushey was entitled to a good faith defense
where his actions were in conformance with department policy.8 Ex-
oneration of the officer on these grounds would not be inconsistent
with a finding of constitutional injury.82 Consequently, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that Heller could proceed with his claim against the city.8 3
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion in a per curiam opinion.84 The Supreme Court's decision noted
that without a jury instruction specifically mentioning the affirmative
defenses, the Court could not presume that the jury directed a verdict
for the officer based on a good faith defense. 85 Since the officer in-
flicted no constitutional injury upon Heller, the Supreme Court rea-
75. Id.
76. Id. at 801 (Stevens, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting) Apparently, the Los Angeles
Police Department had an "escalating force" policy, which included the use of chokeholds. Id. at
802. At trial, the testimony of both the officer who used the chokehold and a Los Angeles Police
Sergeant showed that the officer's actions complied with established Department policy. Id. at
802-03.
77. Id. at 797.
78. At the time Heller was decided, it was common practice in the Ninth Circuit to instruct the
jury on the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S.
796, 798 (1988). Since then, the Supreme Court has admonished that "[i]mmunity ordinarily
should be decided by the court long before trial." Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991)
(per curiam).
79. Heller, 475 U.S. at 798.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 799 (1988) rev'g sub nom. Heller v. Bushey, 759 F.2d 1371 (1985).
85. Heller, 475 U.S. at 798.
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soned that there was no basis for holding the city liable, even if the
city's policy authorized the use of unconstitutional force.86 The per
curiam opinion concluded that "[i]f a person has suffered no constitu-
tional injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the fact that
the departmental regulations might have authorized the use of consti-
tutionally excessive force is quite beside the point. '87
Heller is confusing precedent. 88 Accepting the Court's determina-
tion that the jury was not free to make a good faith or qualified immu-
nity determination without the appropriate instruction, the Court's
conclusion could be read as a "standing" decision. Thus, even if the
jury might have believed that department policy authorized the use of
excessive force, the verdict in favor of Officer Bushey, absent consid-
eration of any affirmative defenses, meant that Bushey did not use
excessive force.89 A plaintiff who cannot show injury caused by the
city's policy has no standing to challenge that policy. The plaintiff in
Heller had a problem under both a Canton derivative liability theory,
as well as under a Collins direct constitutional violation theory. De-
rivative liability will not lie where there is no underlying constitutional
violation by the officer. Nor could the plaintiff challenge or seek re-
dress for injuries due to an unconstitutional policy, where the plaintiff
could show no causal connection between the asserted unconstitu-
tional policy and the plaintiff's injuries.
THE CONFUSION: STATUTORY VERSUS CONSTITUTIONAL LIABILITY,
CANTON DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE VERSUS FARMER
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
Litigants and courts must be careful to satisfy the Collins require-
ment that there be an underlying constitutional violation established
before proceeding to attribute liability to the municipality under
§ 1983 by demonstrating deliberate indifference within the meaning of
Canton. It is this distinction between Canton and Collins, the former a
86. Id. at 799. But see id. at 803 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (opining that because jury did not
decide constitutionality of city's escalating force policy, there would be no inconsistency between
a verdict in favor of officer and imposition of liability on city).
87. Id. at 799.
88. The per curiam nature of the opinion was criticized by the dissenters in the case. See id. at
800 (Stevens, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Whenever the Court decides a case without
the benefit of briefs or argument on the merits, there is a danger that it will issue an opinion
without the careful deliberation and explication that the issues require. Today's per curiam
opinion is a fair illustration of the problem.").
89. Another possibility is that, since the jury was not free to consider qualified immunity, its
decision in favor of Officer Bushey was based on a finding that he followed a Department policy
that was constitutional and that did not authorize or result in the use of excessive force.
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case about statutory interpretation, the latter a case about constitu-
tional violation, that has led to confusion in the case law.
Part of the confusion must be sorted out by distinguishing the stan-
dard of "deliberate indifference" under Canton, which the Court has
set as the required level of culpability needed to establish municipal
responsibility for an underlying constitutional violation, from the vari-
ous standards of culpability, including "deliberate indifference" under
Farmer v. Brennan,90 that the Court has designated as necessary to
establish the different underlying constitutional violations.
For example, in Farmer, the Supreme Court distinguished the objec-
tive test for deliberate indifference established in Canton from the
subjective deliberate indifference test required for culpability under
the Eighth Amendment in prison conditions cases:
It would be hard to describe the Canton understanding of deliberate
indifference, permitting liability to be premised on obviousness or
constructive notice, as anything but objective. Canton's objective
standard, however, is not an appropriate test for determining the
liability of prison officials under the Eighth Amendment as inter-
preted in our cases.91
As Farmer illustrates, establishing Canton objective deliberate indif-
ference is not sufficient to make out an underlying Eighth Amend-
ment claim. A plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable for an
Eighth Amendment violation would have to prove subjective deliber-
ate indifference on the part of the municipal employee(s) before mov-
ing to the second step of showing a municipal policy that was
objectively deliberately indifferent to the likelihood of inmates consti-
tutional rights being violated (i.e., a policy that policymakers knew or
should have known would result in constitutional violations).
90. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
91. Id. The Court in Farmer held that a prison official could be held liable under the Eighth
Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he had actual knowledge of a
substantial risk of serious harm faced by inmates and disregarded that risk by failing to take
reasonable measures to abate it. Id. at 835-36; see Earrey v. Chickasaw County, 965 F. Supp.
870 (N.D. Miss. 1997):
The actions of governmental officials, who are fully capable of subjective deliberate
indifference, serve as the basis of governmental liability for Eighth Amendment viola-
tions. While the governmental entity may only need be shown to be objectively delib-
erately indifferent to the known or obvious consequences of a custom or policy which
does not itself violate federal law, it cannot be held liable unless the plaintiff shows that
a constitutional violation has in fact occurred. In the Eighth Amendment context, in
order for a violation to occur, a prison official must know "that inmates face a substan-
tial risk of serious harm and disregard that risk by failing to take reasonable measures
to abate it."
Id. at 877.
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In Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process cases, where the
level of culpability on the underlying claim has not been definitively
established by the Supreme Court,92 there has been an added layer of
confusion due to uncertainty and disagreement as to what standard
would suffice to make out the substantive due process claim and
whether that standard would remain consistent in different contexts. 93
A majority of courts have applied the subjective "deliberate indiffer-
ence" standard to cases involving medical needs, protection, and treat-
ment of pretrial detainees under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 94 and the Court in Lewis has seemingly ap-
proved the subjective deliberate indifference standard in that
context. 95
HIGH SPEED PURSUITS, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS, AND
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
While there are isolated opinions in other circuits which may reflect
confusion, 96 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has most consistently
embraced an approach to municipal liability that ignores the impor-
tant distinction between the Supreme Court's statutory interpretation
92. Prior to its decision in Lewis, the Court had only stated that something more than "mere
negligence" must be shown to make out a substantive due process claim. Davidson v. Cannon,
474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333 (1986).
93. See, e.g., Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1207 (3d Cir. 1996) (limiting "shocks the con-
science" standard to substantive due process claims asserted in context of police pursuit cases).
94. See, e.g., Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 643 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (concluding
that "a state jail official's constitutional liability to pretrial detainees for episodic acts or omis-
sions should be measured by a standard of subjective deliberate indifference as enunciated by
the Supreme Court in Farmer").
95. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1711 (1998). "The Court has recognized
that deliberate indifference is egregious enough to state a substantive due process claim in one
context, that of deliberate indifference to the medical needs of pretrial detainees." Id. (citing
City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)).
In Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), a case involving the treatment of involuntarily
committed mentally retarded patients, the Supreme Court held that liability could be imposed
"when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted profes-
sional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did
not base the decision on such judgment." Id. at 323. A number of courts have applied the pro-
fessional judgment standard to substantive due process claims raised by involuntarily placed
foster children. See, e.g., Yvonne L. v. New Mexico Dep't of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 893-94
(10th Cir. 1992) (adopting professional judgment standard, rather than deliberate indifference, in
foster care setting).
96. See, e.g., Parrish v. Luckie, 963 F.2d 201, 207 (8th Cir. 1992) ("A public entity or supervi-
sory official may be liable under § 1983, even though no government individuals were personally
liable."); Rivas v. Freeman, 940 F.2d 1491, 1495-96 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding a Sheriff liable in his
official capacity for failure to train officers regarding identification techniques and failure to
properly account for incarcerated suspects, while deputies' actions which flowed from lack of
procedures were deemed mere negligence).
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of § 1983 in Canton and its constitutional analysis of substantive due
process in Collins.97 The context of high speed pursuit cases best illus-
trates the Canton/Collins confusion. This Article will compare the
Third Circuit's approach in Fagan v. City of Vineland98 with that of the
Tenth Circuit in Williams v. City and County of Denver.99 Both deci-
sions were rendered prior to County of Sacramento v. Lewis. While
the Tenth Circuit had granted a rehearing en banc in Williams, it has
since remanded the case to the district court so that the Supreme
Court's decision in Lewis may be taken into account by the trial court.
By examining Fagan and the now vacated Tenth Circuit opinion in
Williams, and by taking into consideration the impact of the Supreme
Court's decision in Lewis, I hope to illustrate that while the analysis in
Fagan is faulty and does confuse the principles of Canton and Collins,
the result, a finding of municipal liability without an underlying sub-
stantive due process violation by the officer, may now be justified. On
the other hand, whereas the analysis in Williams is correct and the
court avoids the Canton/Collins confusion, the result intimated by the
court with respect to municipal liability may not be the right one given
the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements concerning the contex-
tual standard(s) of culpability for substantive due process claims.
THE FA GAN CASE
In Fagan v. City of Vineland,00 the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, sitting en banc, addressed the issue of the level of culpability
required to state a substantive due process claim in the context of a
high-speed police pursuit that resulted in the deaths of three innocent
bystanders.101 The accident survivors, along with the estates and rela-
tives of those killed, brought actions under § 1983 against the officers
and the city.10 2 They alleged that their substantive due process rights
were violated by the officers' recklessness and by the city's failure to
97. See, e.g., Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d Cir. 1996) ("The precedent in our
circuit requires the district court to review the plaintiffs' municipal liability claims independently
of the § 1983 claims against the individual police officers, as the City's liability for a substantive
due process violation does not depend upon the liability of any police officer.").
98. 22 F.3d 1296, 1303 (3d Cir. 1994) (Fagan II) (en banc).
99. Williams v. City & County of Denver, 99 F.3d 1009 (10th Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded
for further proceedings in light of County of Sacramento v. Lewis and Board of County Comm'rs
v. Brown, Williams v. City & County of Denver, 153 F.3d 730 (10th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (en
banc).
100. 804 F. Supp. 591, 603 (D.N.J. 1992) (footnote omitted), affd in part, rev'd and remanded
in part, 22 F.3d 1283 (3d Cir. 1994) 22 F.3d 1296 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc).
101. Fagan, 22 F.3d at 1299.
102. Id. at 1301.
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train the officers properly regarding high-speed pursuits.10 3 The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants on
the constitutional claims, holding that the alleged conduct of the of-
ficers could not be found to satisfy the applicable standard in this con-
text.104 The district court reasoned that a jury could not find that the
actions of the officers constituted "[b]ehavior that shocks the con-
science,... outrageous behavior, or behavior that offends a sense of
justice." 105
A divided panel reversed the part of the district court's decision
that held that a shocks-the-conscience standard was applicable to the
due process claim, the majority holding that "reckless indifference to
public safety" was the standard to be applied in police pursuit cases.10 6
A petition for rehearing en banc was granted, limited to the issue of
"the appropriate standard to be applied in police pursuit cases alleg-
ing a violation of substantive due process. ' 10 7 The majority of the en
banc court concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in Collins
dictated the shocks-the-conscience standard for substantive due pro-
cess claims. 108
Having found no underlying constitutional violation, the district
court concluded that there could be no liability on the part of the city
for failure to train. 10 9 The Third Circuit panel was in agreement, how-
ever, that the city could be found independently liable for the viola-
tion of plaintiffs' constitutional rights even if the individual officers
were found not liable because they lacked the requisite mental state to
be constitutionally accountable.110 This aspect of the panel opinion
was not considered in the en banc rehearing and has been criticized,
rightly so in my opinion, by another panel of the Third Circuit, as well
as by other circuits. 1 The conclusion in Fagan rests on the premise
that a plaintiff who can show injury and Canton-type deliberate indif-
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1302.
105. Fagan, 804 F. Supp. at 603.
106. Fagan 11, 22 F.3d at 1289-90.
107. Id. at 1302.
108. Id. at 1308.
109. Fagan, 804 F. Supp at 606 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heler, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)).
110. Fagan 11, 22 F.3d at 1292.
111. In Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137 (3d Cir. 1995), the court made the follow-
ing observation:
[T]he Fagan panel opinion appeared to hold that a plaintiff can establish a constitu-
tional violation predicate to a claim of municipal liability simply by demonstrating that
the policymakers, acting with deliberate indifference, enacted an inadequate policy that
caused an injury. It appears that, by focusing almost exclusively on the "deliberate
indifference" prong of the Collins test, the panel opinion did not apply the first prong-
establishing an underlying constitutional violation.
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ference on the part of the city may hold the city liable under § 1983
for that injury.
The Fagan analysis leaves one asking "Where's the beef?" With no
constititional violation committed by the non-policymaking em-
ployee(s) and with a showing of only Canton-type deliberate indiffer-
ence, there is simply no constitutional violation made out and there is
no basis for § 1983 liability on anyone's part. The Third Circuit's mis-
take in Fagan is in treating proof of statutory responsibility under
Canton's deliberate indifference standard as proof of constitutional li-
ability under Collins.112
WILLIAMS V. CITY & COUNTY OF DENVER
In Williams, the plaintiff's son was killed when a police vehicle ran a
red light and broadsided the decedent's vehicle.11 3 At the time of the
collision, the officer operating the police vehicle was responding to a
non-emergency request for assistance by another officer.114 The plain-
tiff sued both Officer Farr and the city. 115
Because the district court had determined that the officer's conduct
did not amount to a constitutional violation, it had granted summary
Id. at 1153 n.13; see Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033, 1039 (1st Cir. 1996) (declining invitation to
adopt Fagan analysis "because we believe that the Fagan panel improperly applied the Supreme
Court's teachings").
112. A recent district court opinion recognizes the problem created by the Fagan analysis and
rejects the imposition of municipal liability in absence of "the beef." In Burke v. Mahanoy City,
No. 97-CV-7277, 1999 WL 116291 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 1999) the court noted:
This court finds that we are required to follow Third Circuit law and examine the possi-
bility of municipal liability under § 1983, although the individual officers have not been
held liable in this situation. The present case is close in identity to Fagan because Plain-
tiff has alleged substantive due process claims.... Moreover, Plaintiff has also inde-
pendently alleged constitutional claims against the City, Police Department and Chief
of Police .... Under either scenario for municipal liability, the deliberate indifference
or policy and custom of the municipality must inflict constitutional injury.... Thus, the
mere existence of a policy of inaction or inadequate training of officers with respect to
drinking and disorderly conduct is not actionable under § 1983 if such conduct does not
inflict constitutional injury .... Even if we accept that the existence of a municipal
policy or custom resulted in the failure of individual officers to address the city's
problems of underage drinking, loitering and fighting, such municipal inaction cannot
be said to inflict constitutional injury. Thus, we need not reach the issue of whether
Defendants are subject to Monell liability where, as here, we have concluded that no
constitutional right was violated.
Id. at *12-13.
113. Williams v. City & County of Denver, 99 F.3d 1009, 1012 (10th Cir. 1996), vacated and
remanded for further proceedings in light of County of Sacramento v. Lewis and Board of
County Comm'rs v. Brown, Williams v. City & County of Denver, 153 F.3d 730 (10th Cir. 1998)
(per curiam) (en banc).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1013.
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judgment for the city on the Canton claims. 116 The district court also
rejected the notion that the city could be held liable under § 1983 in-
dependent of the officer's liability.117 In reversing the holding of the
district court on the existence of the underlying constitutional viola-
tion, the court of appeals concluded that "Officer Farr's alleged con-
duct, particularly his decision to speed against a red light through an
intersection on a major boulevard in Denver without slowing down or
activating his siren in non-emergency circumstances, all in violation of
state law and police regulations, could be viewed as reckless and con-
science-shocking[,]" and, therefore, egregious enough to constitute an
underlying substantive due process violation. 118 The court affirmed
summary judgment for the officer, however, based on qualified immu-
nity because the court concluded that the law was not clearly estab-
lished at the time of the accident.11 9 Given sufficient evidence to
make out an underlying constitutional violation by Officer Farr, the
court of appeals also reversed the summary judgment for the city and
remanded for further proceedings.' 20 The court of appeals subse-
quently granted a rehearing en banc, but, given the Supreme Court's
intervening decisions in Brown and Lewis, has now vacated its panel
opinion and remanded to the district court for reconsideration in light
of these two Supreme Court opinions. 21 If the forthcoming opinion
of the district court results in a determination that an underlying sub-
stantive due process violation was committed by the officer, then the
plaintiff could proceed with her municipal liability claim based on the
deliberate indifference of the city in the hiring, training, and supervis-
ing of Officer Farr. This would be a Canton-type claim dependent
upon an underlying constitutional wrong having been committed by
Officer Farr.
Unlike the district court's original opinion, the now vacated panel
opinion of the court of appeals acknowledged that a claim could be
asserted directly against the city on a Collins theory, but affirmed
summary judgment for the city on this basis since there was not
enough evidence from which a jury could find that the city's conduct
was "so egregious, outrageous and fraught with unreasonable risk as
to shock the conscience.' 22 Thus, the Tenth Circuit panel opinion
recognized that in cases where the plaintiff's underlying constitutional
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1017.
119. Williams, 99 F.3d at 1021.
120. Id.
121. Williams v. City & County of Denver, 153 F.3d 730 (10th Cir. 1998).
122. Williams, 99 F.3d at 1020.
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claim depends upon establishing a particular state of mind on the part
of the non-policymaking employee, there may be situations in which
an officer inflicts the injury, but lacks the requisite state of mind.123 In
these cases, the plaintiff should be able to proceed directly against the
government entity on a Collins theory if the plaintiff can demonstrate:
(1) that the policymaker(s) possessed the requisite state of mind re-
quired to make out a constitutional violation, and (2) that the poli-
cymaker's acts or omissions were the "moving force" behind the
plaintiff's injury.
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO v. LEwis
In Lewis, the Court granted certiorari "to resolve a conflict among
the circuits over the standard of culpability on the part of a law en-
forcement officer for violating substantive due process in a pursuit
case."'1 24 The decedent in Lewis was a sixteen-year-old passenger on a
motorcycle driven by a friend. 125 A pursuit took place when the
driver of the motorcycle ignored an officer's attempt to stop him for
speeding. 126 The chase reached speeds of up to 100 miles per hour
and ended when the motorcycle failed to maneuver a turn, resulting in
both the driver and passenger falling off the cycle.' 27 The police of-
ficer in pursuit skidded into Lewis, propelling him seventy feet down
the road.' 28 Lewis died as a result of his injuries.129
Because Supreme Court precedent precluded application of the
Fourth Amendment to the facts of the case, 30 the Court first had to
resolve whether the plaintiff could state a Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process claim in the pursuit context, and, if so,
whether the allegations set out by the plaintiff were sufficient to estab-
lish such a claim. 131
Justice Souter, writing the majority opinion, noted that the Court
had recently expressed its view on the first question and pointed to
the following language in United States v. Lanier:132
123. Id. at 1015-16.
124. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998).
125. Id. at 1712.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991). Hodari D. held that police pursuit
does not amount to "seizure" within meaning of Fourth Amendment. Id. Fourth Amendment
"seizure occurs only when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through
means intentionally applied." Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989).
131. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at 1714-15.
132. 520 U.S. 259 (1997).
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Graham v. Connor ... does not hold that all constitutional claims
relating to physically abusive government conduct must arise under
either the Fourth or Eighth Amendments; rather, Graham simply
requires that if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific consti-
tutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the
claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that spe-
cific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process. 133
Thus, given the facts of Lewis and the inapplicability of a more spe-
cific constitutional provision, the plaintiff could assert a claim under
the Fourteenth Amendment for a violation of substantive due pro-
cess. 134 The Court expressly rejected as "unsound,"1135 the contrary
position taken by the Seventh Circuit in Mays v. City of East St.
Louis.
13 6
The more difficult question was the standard of culpability the
plaintiff would have to demonstrate to make out a substantive due
process claim in the pursuit context. In Lewis, the Ninth Circuit had
held that "deliberate indifference or reckless disregard" was the ap-
133. Id. at 272 n.7.
134. See Petta v. Rivera, 143 F.3d 895, 901 (5th Cir. 1998), concluding that:
As have all of the courts of appeals that have addressed the issue, that a plaintiff whose
claim is not susceptible to proper analysis with reference to a specific constitutional
right may still state a claim under § 1983 for a violation of his or her Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process right, and have the claim judged by the constitu-
tional standard which governs that right.
Id.; Hemphill v. Schott, 141 F.3d 412 (2d Cir. 1998):
This court has held that outside the context of an arrest, a plaintiff may make claims of
excessive force under § 1983 under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. . . .One embodiment of this still extant claim for relief from excessive force
based in Due Process is the situation in which a state actor aids and abets a private
party in subjecting a citizen to unwarranted physical harm .... Graham's holding that
excessive force claims in the context of an arrest are to be analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment's objective standards does not extend to this unusual situation in which
the police officers allegedly engaged in a deprivation of rights coincident with, but dis-
tinct from, their arrest of the suspect.
Id. at 418-19; Sanchez v. Figueroa, 996 F. Supp. 143, 147-48 (D.P.R. 1998):
While substantive due process analysis has been rendered inapposite to situations to
which specific constitutional amendments apply, . . .the factors set forth by Judge
Friendly in Glick remain useful in analyzing claims of excessive force by innocent by-
standers who have no Fourth or Eighth Amendment claims.
Id.
135. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at 1715.
136. 123 F.3d 999 (7th Cir. 1997). The court held that where passengers in suspect's car sued
for injuries sustained in context of high-speed pursuit,
[c]aution in the creation of new rights leads us to conclude that the sort of claim plain-
tiffs make is not a proper invocation of substantive due process .... [O]nce the substan-
tive criteria of the fourth amendment have been applied, there is neither need nor
justification for another substantive inquiry-one based not on constitutional text but
on an inference from structure.
Id. at 1002.
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propriate standard for a substantive due process claim arising from a
high-speed pursuit. 137 The Ninth Circuit's holding was in direct con-
flict with decisions of other circuits requiring conduct that "shocks the
conscience" in high-speed pursuit cases.138
The Court first observed that "the core of the concept" of due pro-
cess has always been the notion of "protection against arbitrary ac-
tion.' 39 What will be considered "fatally arbitrary," however, will
"differ depending on whether it is legislation or a specific act of a gov-
ernmental officer that is at issue.' 40 To establish an executive abuse
of power that is "fatally arbitrary," the plaintiff will have to demon-
strate conduct that "shocks the conscience.' 41 The Court acknowl-
edged that "the measure of what is conscience-shocking is no
calibrated yard stick," and "that the constitutional concept of con-
science-shocking duplicates no traditional category of common-law
fault."'1 42 Most likely to reach the conscience-shocking level would be
"conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any govern-
ment interest.' 43
Approving of the deliberate indifference standard applied to sub-
stantive due process claims of pretrial detainees complaining of inade-
quate attention to health and safety needs, the Court distinguished
high-speed pursuits by law enforcement officers as presenting "mark-
edly different circumstances.' 44 The Court noted substantial author-
ity for different standards of culpability being applied to the same
constitutional provision.145 Thus, in the Eighth Amendment prison
context, while deliberate indifference to medical needs may establish
137. Lewis v. Sacramento County, 98 F.3d 434, 441 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 1708
(1998).
138. See, e.g., Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033 (1st Cir. 1996). "[P]olice officers' deliberate indif-
ference to a victim's rights, standing alone, is not a sufficient predicate for a substantive due
process claim in a police pursuit case. Rather, in such a case, the plaintiff must also show that
the officers' conduct shocks the conscience." Id. at 1038; Williams v. City & County of Denver,
99 F.3d 1009, 1017 (10th Cir. 1996) (concluding that officer's "decision to speed against a red
light through an intersection on a major boulevard in Denver without slowing down or activating
his siren in non-emergency circumstances.., could be viewed as reckless and conscience-shock-
ing"), vacated and remanded for further proceedings in light of County of Sacramento v. Lewis
and Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, Williams v. City & County of Denver, 153 F.3d 730
(10th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (en banc); Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1303 (3d Cir.
1994) (en banc) (holding that "the appropriate standard by which to judge the police conduct [in
a high speed pursuit case] is the 'shocks the conscience' standard").
139. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at 1716.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1717.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1718.
144. Id. at 1719.
145. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at 1719-20.
1999]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
constitutional liability, t 46 the Court has required prisoners asserting
excessive force claims in the context of a prison riot to show that the
force was used "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of
causing harm. ' '147 The Court analogized police officers engaged in
sudden police chases to prison officials facing a riot and concluded:
Just as a purpose to cause harm is needed for Eighth Amendment
liability in a riot case, so it ought to be needed for Due Process
liability in a pursuit case. Accordingly, we hold that high-speed
chases with no intent to harm suspects physically or to worsen their
legal plight do not give rise to liability under the Fourteenth
Amendment, redressible by an action under § 1983.148
With no suggestion of improper or malicious motive on the part of the
officer in Lewis, the alleged conduct could not be found "conscience-
shocking."'1 49 Thus, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of
Appeals. 150
Lewis, like Collins, is a decision dealing with the requirements of
the underlying constitutional violation. The case sets out the level of
culpability that the plaintiff must prove to hold the individual officer
liable for a substantive due process violation in the context of a high
speed pursuit. It is not a case about municipal responsibility under
§ 1983, and it is not a case about substantive due process claims in
other contexts. The Court does, however, clarify that not all substan-
tive due process claims will be subject to the same level of culpabil-
ity.151 To read the case as a source of municipal liability under § 1983,
one must discern from the opinion what standard the Court might ap-
146. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
147. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986). See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6
(1992), where the "malicious and sadistic" standard was applied to a prisoner's excessive force
claim that arose in a non-riot, non-emergency context.
148. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at 1720.
149. Id. at 1720-21.
150. Id. at 1721. While six of the Justices concurred in the judgment and opinion of the
Court, Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Thomas concurred only in the judgment. Id. at 1723. Justice
Stevens would have reinstated the judgment of the district court which had disposed of the case
on qualified immunity grounds on the basis that the law was not clearly established at the time.
Id. He would have left resolution of the difficult constitutional question for a case against a
municipality. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, suggested that the appropriate test for a substantive
due process claim was "whether our Nation has traditionally protected the right respondents
assert" rather than "whether the police conduct here at issue shocks my unelected conscience."
Id. at 1724. (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia "would
reverse the judgment of the Ninth Circuit, not on the ground that petitioners have failed to
shock my still, soft voice within, but on the ground that respondents offer no textual or historical
support for their alleged due process right." Id. at 1726.
151. Id. at 1716.
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ply to hold the municipality itself, through it policymakers, liable for a
substantive due process violation.
While Williams is a work in progress that may well be completed
before these Symposium articles are published, the case serves as an
excellent vehicle for examining the impact that Lewis may have on the
Canton/Collins confusion in the context of substantive due process
claims. As Williams winds its way through the trial court and, most
likely, through the court of appeals again, three major issues will need
to be reexamined in light of Brown and Lewis. First, is there sufficient
evidence to support a determination that Officer Farr violated the
plaintiff's decedent's substantive due process rights? Second, if so, can
the plaintiff make out the requisite level of deliberate indifference de-
manded by Brown to attribute the underlying constitutional violation
to the city on a Canton-type theory? Third, if there is no underlying
constitutional violation by Officer Farr, can the plaintiff assert a claim
directly against the city based on its own violation of the plaintiff's
substantive due process rights?
Given the facts of Williams, the plaintiff should not have to satisfy
the Lewis "intent to harm" standard to prove a violation of the dece-
dent's substantive due process rights. Officer Farr was not engaged in
a high-speed pursuit, but was responding to a non-emergency call
from another officer.152 While he may have been pursuing police
business, he was not pursuing "bad guys." The Court in Lewis evi-
dences concern with the need for officers to be able to respond to
emergency situations without fear of civil liability. The analogy to the
"prison riot" underscores the focus of the decision on officers who
confront "an occasion calling for fast action," officers who do not have
the "luxury" of deliberating or reflecting about the course of conduct
to pursue in the given circumstances. 153
In a post-Lewis case, the Tenth Circuit has interpreted the Supreme
Court decision to draw this distinction between contexts where of-
ficers are confronted with sudden, tense, rapidly developing or emer-
gency-type situations and contexts in which there is time to deliberate.
In Radecki v. Barela,154 the court states:
[I]n assessing the constitutionality of law enforcement actions, we
now distinguish between emergency action and actions taken after
152. Id. at 1719-20.
153. Id. at 1720.
154. 146 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 869 (1999). Radecki was not a
high-speed pursuit case. It involved an officer who was engaged in a struggle with a suspect and
ordered an innocent bystander to assist. Id. at 1228. In his attempt to help the officer, the
innocent bystander was shot and killed by the suspect. Id. It is apparent that Lewis' "intent to
harm" standard for substantive due process claims will not be confined to the high-speed pursuit
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opportunity for reflection. Appropriately, we are required to give
great deference to the decisions that necessarily occur in emergency
situations.... Henceforth, we look to the nature of the official con-
duct on the spectrum of culpability that has tort liability at one end.
On the opposite, far side of that spectrum is conduct in which the
government official intended to cause harm and in which the state
lacks any justifiable interest. In emergency situations, only conduct
that reaches that far point will shock the conscience and result in
constitutional liability. Where the state actor has the luxury to truly
deliberate about the decisions he or she is making, something less
than unjustifiable intent to harm, such as calculated indifference,
may suffice to shock the conscience.' 55
Given the "contextual" nature of the level of culpability for substan-
tive due process claims, the facts of Williams arguably present a con-
text in which the Lewis "intent to harm" standard should not apply.
Instead, it should suffice to "shock the conscience" if Officer Farr's
conduct is deemed reckless and deliberately indifferent to the obvious
and serious risk he created to the safety of those around him. In the
words of the Tenth Circuit, calculated indifference should be
enough. 156
If Officer Farr is found to have committed the underlying substan-
tive due process violation, then the plaintiff could proceed against the
City on a Canton/Brown theory of liability. The officer was proceeding
down a major Denver boulevard at sixty miles per hour in a thirty-five
context. See, e.g., Moreland v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 159 F.3d 365, 372-73
(9th Cir. 1998):
The question we face today is whether [the Lewis] newly minted explanation of the
"shocks the conscience" standard also controls in cases where it is alleged that an of-
ficer inadvertently harmed a bystander while responding to a situation in which the
officer was required to act quickly to prevent an individual from threatening the lives of
others. We conclude that it does.... Expressly declining to draw a bright line rule, the
Court described the critical consideration as whether the circumstances are such that
"actual deliberation is practical.". . . [Elach of the circuits that has interpreted and
applied this aspect of the Lewis decision has recognized that the critical question in
determining the appropriate standard of culpability is whether the circumstances al-
lowed the state actors time to fully consider the potential consequences of their
conduct.
Id.; Schaefer v. Goch, 153 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 1998) (concluding that where officers shot
innocent party instead of suspect, "[t]he situation was fluid, uncertain, and above all dangerous,
and the officers' decision to shoot, regrettable though its results turned out to be, does not shock
the conscience"); Medeiros v. O'Connell, 150 F.3d 164, 170 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing how the
Lewis "shocks the conscience" standard was not satisfied where the bullet intended for the sus-
pect deflected and hit hostage).
155. Radecki, 146 F.3d at 1231-32.
156. Id. at 1232. Another possibility is that since proof of "intent to harm" will rarely be
made through direct evidence, the lack of a legitimate law enforcement purpose for the officer's
conduct may be considered as evidence of the impermissible purpose required to make out the
constitutional violation.
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mile-per-hour zone with his overhead lights on, but no siren.157 The
officer involved had his license revoked on three separate occasions
and had a number of traffic violations. 158 Additionally, the executive
director of the Denver Civil Service Commission cautioned the city
against hiring the officer and attached a note to his file stating, "Do
not waste time on this one. Three suspensions. Flunks because of driv-
ing record.1 59 A psychologist recommended that the city conduct
further investigations before hiring the officer.' 60 The city, however,
failed to conduct any additional investigations.1 61 Moreover, the city
did not provide the officer with any special driving training and he had
nine incidents of poor driving during the training the city did give
him. a62 The facts of Williams present an egregious case of a single,
bad hire that would satisfy even the more rigorous "plainly obvious
consequence" rule of Brown. 63 Given the facts with respect to the
background of Officer Farr, it is difficult to imagine that the evidence
would be insufficient as a matter of law for a jury to conclude that a
policymaker screening Farr's record would not have understood that a
"plainly obvious consequence" of hiring Farr would be the violation of
someone's constitutional rights through the operation of a motor
vehicle.
If, despite the fact that Officer Farr was not engaged in a high-speed
pursuit and was not involved in an "emergency" situation, the court
applies the Lewis "intent to harm" standard and concludes that the
application of this standard precludes a finding of a substantive due
process violation by Farr, then the Canton/Brown claim against the
city dissolves. This liability is founded on derivative, statutory respon-
sibility for the underlying constitutional violation. Without a substan-
tive due process violation by Farr, there can be no derivative liability
on the part of the city under § 1983. But does Lewis provide the
"beef" for a substantive due process claim directly against the city?
This author would argue that even if the plaintiff cannot make out
the requisite level of culpability to establish a substantive due process
claim against Officer Farr, that should not preclude a successful sub-
stantive due process claim against the city based on a different level of
culpability applicable to the policymakers who hired, trained and su-
pervised Farr. This would not be a Canton/Brown derivative sort of
157. Williams v. City & County of Denver, 99 F.3d 1009, 1012 (10th Cir. 1996).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 398 (1997).
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liability. This claim would be based on the City's own violation of the
plaintiff's constitutional rights. While the Tenth Circuit panel opinion
in Williams recognized the possibility of the plaintiff asserting a claim
directly against the city based on its own substantive due process vio-
lation, the court applied the same standard of culpability that it ap-
plied to the individual officer who inflicted the injury. That standard
embodied the pre-Lewis notion of "shocks the conscience" as outra-
geous, egregious behavior that required a showing of more than delib-
erate or reckless indifference. 164
The Court in Lewis clearly acknowledged that less than "intent to
harm" would suffice for a substantive due process violation in some
Fourteenth Amendment contexts.165 The subjective deliberate indif-
ference standard borrowed from the Eighth Amendment context has
been approved by the Supreme Court as applicable in the Fourteenth
Amendment pretrial detainee cases. 166 The Court could have drawn a
clear line in Lewis between contexts involving those in "custody,"
where deliberate indifference would suffice to shock the conscience,
and contexts involving "free citizens," where the level of culpability
would rise to "intent to harm." Instead, the Court has made the level
of culpability in substantive due process claims, like the standard in
Eighth Amendment cases, a variable that depends not on the status of
the victim, but rather on the situation confronting the state actor.
Great deference is given to the officer who must act quickly in an
emergency situation, with no time for weighing, deliberating, or calcu-
lating the foreseeable consequences of his conduct. Great deference
gives way to greater scrutiny, however, when the state actor is in a
situation that allows for, perhaps even requires, deliberation, reflec-
tion, and consideration of obvious or foreseeable consequences flow-
ing from the actor's conduct or decisions.167
164. See Williams, 99 F.3d at 1020.
165. Lewis v. City of Sacramento, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1711 (1998).
166. Id.
167. A recent district court opinion provides an unusual application of this approach (defer-
ence giving way to greater scrutiny, depending on the opportunity to deliberate). The court
subjects an officer's conduct in the context of high speed pursuit to different scrutiny and varying
standards as the pursuit is prolonged and escalates in its level of recklessness and risk to public
safety. The Court's observation in Feist v. Simonson, No. CIV. 97-1882 ADM/AJB, 1999 WL
61888 (D. Minn. Feb. 8, 1999) are worth noting in some detail:
In cases involving split-second judgments, difficult law enforcement choices, and sud-
den instincts, police officers must be given broad discretion to act. However, undis-
puted facts of this case present a far different factual predicate which takes the decision
making process outside the realm of "split second judgment." In his pursuit of Shan-
non, Simonson was initially engaging in the same sort of instantaneous judgments and
reactions as those required of the officer in Lewis or the prison guards in the riot cases.
The initial decision to activate his lights and siren and commence pursuit was one made
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OTHER CASES
As the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has observed, the
Supreme Court "has not directly addressed the question of how Mo-
nell's standard for municipal liability meshes with Farmer's require-
ment of subjective knowledge. 1 68  Proof that a policymaker had
actual knowledge of the substantial risk of constitutional injury cre-
ated by his act or omission and failed to take reasonable steps to elim-
inate or reduce that risk should suffice to establish the requisite
subjective deliberate indifference on the part of the city itself.' 69
Judge Becker, now Chief Judge, writing for the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit essentially adopted this view in a case decided
before Fagan and before the Supreme Court's decision in Collins.
in haste and can easily be justified under the circumstances. However, the situation
then escalated step-by-step into one of greater and greater potential for harm to the
general public. What began as a chase down residential roads soon escalated to a high-
speed run through stop lights and down the wrong way of busy one-way streets. What
then became a dangerous pursuit entering a busy interstate eventually became a deadly
pursuit back onto the same interstate, this time heading at break-neck speeds the
wrong direction against heavy traffic. The entire chase lasted over six minutes and
measured over six miles. The wrong-way portion of the chase down the busy interstate
covered over 1.2 miles on its own, heading through one tunnel and toward a second-
crashing to a tragic halt causing Feist's death. While Officer Simonson should be af-
forded deference for his initial decision, the contention that he did not have the time or
ability to clearly assess the rising levels of potential danger in the situation should be
subject to further analysis. At many points during the chase, Simonson had the oppor-
tunity to balance the law enforcement goal of apprehending Shannon for use of a stolen
vehicle (a low-level penalty likely carrying no prison time) against the threat to the
general public. Each new turn onto one-way streets and especially the accessing the
freeway to drive on the wrong side of the median, presented a juncture for reassess-
ment and evaluation of the escalating consequences of the chase. Rather than aborting
the chase as the danger increased, the speed and number of pursuing vehicles also in-
creased. While catching a car thief is a law enforcement goal, there is no indication
that, had Simonson suspended the chase, the MPD would not have been able to even-
tually apprehend Shannon. Simonson had secured a physical description and license
number of the vehicle; he likely could make an eyewitness identification of the driver;
and numerous MPD officers had been notified of the chase and called to the area in the
event of a "bail" or exit off the freeway. A review of Simonson's conduct, in light of
Lewis and other established precedent, reveals that genuine issues of fact exist as to
whether his actions "shocked the conscience" for the purpose of a substantive due pro-
cess claim.
Id. at *9-10, *15 n.4.
168. Doe v. Washington County, 150 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir. 1998).
169. In Doe, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a verdict against the County for violating the plain-
tiff's substantive due process right to protection from harm inflicted by other juvenile detainees,
concluding that "[wihatever the standard may be, the evidence nonetheless adequately estab-
lishe[d] subjective knowledge on the part of Sheriff McKee, who, in his own testimony, acknowl-
edged the dangers of housing five juveniles together in a 200-square-foot, short-term holding cell
for months at a time." Id.
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In Simmons v. City of Philadelphia,170 the plaintiff, the mother and
administratrix of the estate of the decedent, brought suit under § 1983
against the city and the individual officer who was the "turnkey" on
duty when her son hanged himself after being taken into custody for
public intoxication. 171 Municipal liability was predicated upon two
theories: First, "that the City violated Simmons's constitutional right
to due process through a policy or custom of inattention amounting to
deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of intoxicated and
potentially suicidal detainees," and second, "that the City violated
Simmons's due process rights through a deliberately indifferent failure
to train its officers to detect and to meet those serious needs."'1 72
The jury in Simmons found that the individual officer, although neg-
ligent, did not violate Simmons's constitutional rights, but that the city
was liable under § 1983.173 One of the many issues raised on appeal
was whether, in light of Heller, the city could be held liable under
§ 1983 where the individual, low-level official was found not to have
violated decedent's constitutional rights.174 In affirming the verdict
against the city, Judge Becker engaged in a lengthy analysis of munici-
pal liability based on a custom, policy, or failure to train, concluding
that to establish municipal liability, principles set forth by the
Supreme Court in its "Pembaur trio"'175 must be satisfied.176 The
plaintiff must both identify a particular official with policymaking au-
thority in the area and adduce "scienter-like" evidence with respect to
that policymaker. 177
Judge Becker drew support for the imposition of a "scienter-like"
evidence requirement not only from the Pembaur trio, but also from
Wilson v. Seiter,178 in which the Supreme Court held that a prisoner
challenging conditions of confinement under the Eighth Amendment
must establish "a culpable state of mind" on the part of particular
prison officials. 179 Finding the level of care owed to pretrial detainees
to be at least the same as that owed to convicted prisoners under the
Eighth Amendment, Judge Becker determined that Wilson supported
his conclusion that the plaintiff was required to adduce "scienter-like"
170. 947 F.2d 1042 (3d Cir. 1991).
171. Id. at 1050.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1054.
174. Id. at 1059.
175. Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485
U.S. 112 (1988); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
176. Simmons, 947 F.2d at 1064.
177. Id. at 1063.
178. 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
179. See Simmons, 947 F.2d at 1062-63.
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evidence of deliberate indifference of identified policymakers. 180
Judge Becker noted that the plaintiff need not name the specific poli-
cymaker as a defendant, nor obtain a verdict against him to prevail
against the municipality. 18 The plaintiff must only present evidence
of the policymaker's "knowledge and his decisionmaking or
acquiescence."1 82
In a concurring opinion, then Chief Judge Sloviter objected to the
"scienter-like" requirement imposed by Judge Becker.183 Judge
Sloviter's concern was that insisting upon a showing of "scienter"
would limit § 1983 cases "to those where plaintiffs can show defend-
ants knew of the constitutional deprivation and exclud[e] those cases
where plaintiffs argue that defendants should have known of it."
s184
Interpreting "scienter" to require actual knowledge and intentional
conduct, Judge Sloviter concluded the requirement was inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's decision in Canton.18 5
Examining Simmons through the lens of subsequent Supreme Court
decisions, this author would conclude that Judge Sloviter was right
that Judge Becker's "scienter-like" requirement is not consistent with
the objective deliberate indifference standard of Canton, which would
hold a municipality liable for constitutional violations committed by
nonpolicymaking employees where policymakers knew or should have
known that their acts or omissions would cause such constitutional in-
juries to be inflicted upon citizens with whom their employees came
into contact. Deliberate indifference under Canton does not require
actual knowledge or intentional conduct. If Canton deliberate indif-
ference were the appropriate standard, then Judge Becker could be
180. Id. at 1064 n.20.
181. Id. at 1261.
182. Id. at 1065 n.21. See Brown v. City of Margate, 842 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Fla. 1993), where
the court makes the following observation:
Defendant argues that because a municipality can only act through natural persons, the
City of Margate could not be found liable unless one or more of the individual named
Defendants had also been found liable. Defendants do not cite any authority for this
argument, and it merits no more than brief consideration here.... The jury may not
have been able to decide conclusively which official was ultimately responsible for the
City's policies, and therefore declined to find any particular individual liable. This is
not necessarily inconsistent with a finding that someone or some combination of policy-
makers had implicitly or explicitly condoned a policy of tolerance toward the excessive
use of force.
Id. at 519.
183. Simmons, 947 F.2d at 1089.
184. Id. at 1090 (Sloviter, C.J., concurring).
185. Id. at 1091.
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accused of having "given undue weight to the 'deliberate,' or 'scien-
ter,' element of these uneasily yoked terms. '186
On the other hand, Judge Becker was right to insist upon a higher
level of culpability, a "scienter-like" requirement on the part of identi-
fied policymakers, since Simmons was not about Canton-type deriva-
tive, statutory liability but, rather, was about the underlying
constitutional violation committed by the city. In this sense, Judge
Sloviter's opinion could be criticized for having "emphasize[d] 'indif-
ference' to the exclusion of the word 'deliberate' to which it is
yoked." 187
In two recent opinions, the Seventh Circuit has first commented
upon, and then, oddly enough, displayed the sort of Canton/Collins
confusion discussed in this Article. In Contreras v. City of Chicago,188
the court leveled the following criticism at the plaintiffs:
We would first note that much of the plaintiffs' argument reflects a
confusion between what constitutes a constitutional violation and
what makes a municipality liable for constitutional violations. Both
in the District Court and here on appeal, the plaintiffs invoked 'fail-
ure to train' and 'deliberate indifference' theories as the basis for
the substantive due process claim .... Notions of 'deliberate indif-
ference' and 'failure to train,' however, are derived from municipal
liability cases such as [Monell, Canton] and most recently [Brown].
Those cases presume that a constitutional violation has occurred
(typically by a municipal employee) and then ask whether the mu-
nicipality itself may be liable for the violations .... The liability of
the City of Chicago for any deliberate indifference or for failing to
train DCS inspectors is therefore secondary to the basic issue of
whether a constitutional guarantee has been violated. 189
In Armstrong v. Squadrito,190 however, a post-Lewis decision rais-
ing the issue of municipal liability for a substantive due process claim
arising from an extended detention after arrest on a writ of body at-
tachment, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals suggests that the ob-
jective Canton/Brown deliberate indifference standard is the level of
culpability sufficient to find county liability on a constitutional basis.
A "body attachment warrant" was issued for the arrest of the plaintiff
when he allegedly failed to appear for a contempt hearing on child
support payments. 191 The plaintiff voluntarily surrendered and was
informed there would be a brief detention until he was escorted to
186. Id. at 1060 n.13.
187. Id.
188. 119 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir. 1997).
189. Id. at 1294.
190. 152 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 1998).
191. Id. at 567.
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court or received a court date.192 He was told he could expect to be
released the same day.193 Due to a "will call" system adopted by the
county jail, which system was geared to numbers rather than names,
and a transcription error with respect to the plaintiff's file number, the
plaintiff remained incarcerated for fifty-seven days with no court ap-
pearance, despite his increasingly vociferous complaints. 194 The plain-
tiff sued the sheriff and jail commander in their official capacities and
the confinement officers in their individual capacities. 195 The district
court granted summary judgment for all defendants. 196 The Seventh
Circuit reversed and remanded. 19
7
After concluding that the circumstances of the plaintiff's confine-
ment gave rise to a liberty interest that was protected by substantive
due process,198 the court proceeded to the next step of its analysis, 199
which asked whether "the defendants' conduct offend[ed] the stan-
dards of substantive due process. ' 200 Noting that the Supreme Court
had endorsed the deliberate indifference standard in contexts like the
prison setting, where there was time for reflection and forethought,
the court of appeals then addressed what constituted deliberate indif-
ference. 201 The court acknowledged that deliberate indifference in the
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 567-68.
195. Id. at 569. Thus, the suit was considered to be against the mumicipality or County itself.
Id. at 577 (citing Yeksigian v. Nappi, 900 F.2d 101, 103 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing Kentucky v. Gra-
ham, 473 U.S. 159, 166-67 & n.14 (1985))).
196. Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 569.
197. Id. at 567.
198. Id. at 571-76.
199. The court adopted the following approach in analyzing plaintiff's claims:
First, we examine whether the Due Process Clause protects against an extended deten-
tion, without an appearance before a magistrate, following an arrest pursuant to valid
bodily attachment. Second, we will explore whether the defendants' conduct offended
the standards of substantive due process. And third, we will consider whether the total-
ity of the circumstances shocks the conscience.
Id. at 570. Although the whole 3-step analysis addresses a question of law, whether the defend-
ants' conduct violated substantive due process, the Court of Appeals thought the issue of delib-
erate indifference under the second step should be decided by the jury, while the ultimate
"totality of the circumstances/shocks the conscience" question must be determined by the court.
Id. at 577. The Supreme Court in Lewis did not state whether the conscience-shocking determi-
nation was to be made by the judge or jury. There is some difference of opinion on this among
the lower federal courts. Compare Bovari v. Town of Saugus, 113 F.3d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1997) (hold-
ing conscience-shocking determination is question for jury) and Mellott v. Heemer, No. CV-94-
2071, 1997 WL 447844, at *15 (M.D. Pa. July 23, 1997) ("The question of whether conduct is
'truly conscience shocking' is one for the jury."), rev'd on other grounds, 161 F.3d 117 (3d Cir.
1998) with Mason v. Stock, 955 F. Supp. 1293, 1308 (D. Kan. 1997) (finding shock-the-conscience
determination is not a jury question).
200. Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 576.
201. Id.
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Eighth Amendment context required the plaintiffs to prove that the
defendants had actual knowledge of the serious risk of harm to which
the plaintiffs were exposed and failed to take reasonable steps to pre-
vent the harm from occurring.20 2 Nevertheless, the court determined
that in the Fourteenth Amendment context and in contexts involving
municipal liability for substantive due process violations, "the stan-
dard for deliberate indifference appears closer to tort recklessness,"
requiring a showing of a "'conscious disregard of known or obvious
dangers." 20 3 In reaching this conclusion as to what the deliberate in-
difference standard entails for Fourteenth Amendment substantive
due process claims asserting municipal liability, the court of appeals
relied on Seventh Circuit and Supreme Court precedent that dealt
with Canton/Brown municipal statutory liability under § 1983 for un-
derlying constitutional violations committed by non-policymaking
employees. 20 4
The court concluded that the "will call" system evidenced a policy
of deliberate indifference, but was saved from that characterization by
a provision allowing for the filing of "complaint forms," through
which detainees could inquire into court dates or release dates.20 5 The
reality was, however, that there was also a policy or custom of refusing
to accept such complaint forms from detainees inquiring about court
dates.206 Analogizing a refusal to accept the complaint form to a re-
fusal to respond to a reasonable request for medical assistance, the
court concluded that "the refusal to accept complaints vitiate[d] the
salutary effect of the complaint form and return[ed] us to the serious
problems evident in the will call system. °20 7 Thus, the plaintiff sur-
vived summary judgment on this claim against the county.
The court treated the claims against the confinement officers in
their individual capacities as separate and independent of the claims
against the county, and the plaintiff also survived summary judgment
202. Id. at 577.
203. Id. at 576-77.
204. Id. at 577. The court cited West v. Waymire, 114 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 1997), in which the
Seventh Circuit had relied on Brown in rejecting municipal liability on a failure to train or super-
vise theory, where a police officer, acting under color of law, had sexual relations with a thirteen-
year-old girl. Id. at 651. In West, there was clearly an underlying substantive due process viola-
tion committed by the officer. Id. at 647. The only question was whether the Town could be
held liable for that violation on a Harris/Brown theory. Id. The Court of Appeals in West con-
cluded that sexual molestation of young girls by officers was not so foreseeable or so likely that
the Town was obligated to train against it or adopt measures to prevent such conduct. Id. at 650.
205. Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 579.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 579-80.
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as to those claims.208 The refusal to convey the plaintiff's complaints
to superiors as well as the refusal to pay any heed to the plaintiff's
repeated protests would suffice to prove the deliberate indifference of
the individual defendants as required by Lewis. 20 9 What is confusing
about the opinion in Armstrong is that it was a Canton/Brown kind of
case with respect to the issue of municipal liability, yet the court does
a Collins/Lewis analysis of the claim. If the jury finds an underlying
substantive due process violation by the confinement officers, the
claim against the county should be a derivative one based on the cus-
tom or policy of refusing to accept complaint forms when the plainly
obvious consequence of that policy would be unconstitutional deten-
tions. The implication of the Seventh Circuit's decision is that even if
the jury does not find deliberate indifference on the part of the con-
finement officers, the claim against the county could proceed based on
its own deliberately indifferent policy or custom. Having absolved the
named policymakers of any actual knowledge or personal involvement
in the conduct giving rise to Armstrong's claim,210 the court is clearly
holding that a finding of objective deliberate indifference by the jury
would be sufficient for the court to find the County's conduct con-
science-shocking. In this light, the Seventh Circuit opinion in Arm-
strong is very much like the Third Circuit's opinion in Fagan, in that
the Seventh Circuit would seemingly allow municipal liability based
on Canton-type deliberate indifference, with no showing of an under-
lying constitutional violation.
CONCLUSION
It may be that the Supreme Court will ultimately settle on Canton-
Brown objective deliberate indifference as the appropriate standard
for holding a municipality liable for its own constitutional violations
in contexts where there is time and opportunity for deliberation by
policymakers whose acts or omissions affect interests protected by
substantive due process. However, until or unless the Supreme Court
signals that the Canton/Brown standard of deliberate indifference will
208. Id. at 580.
209. Id. As the court observed:
Armstrong's repeated and increasingly strenuous complaints should have provided the
guards with sufficient knowledge to suspect improper confinement and take additional
action. Armstrong claims that, given this knowledge, their failure to transmit his com-
plaints to the jail authorities constitutes deliberate indifference. This argument dove-
tails smoothly with the Supreme Court's emphasis on "unhurried judgments, upon the
chance for repeated reflection."
Id. (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998)).
210. Id. at 581.
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suffice to hold a municipality liable on a constitutional level, courts
should follow the analysis done by the Tenth Circuit in Williams, but
use the standard of subjective deliberate indifference (akin to the "sci-
enter-like" requirement in Simmons), rather than the "intent to
harm" standard, for the underlying constitutional claim against the
city. Proving subjective deliberate indifference on the part of a poli-
cymaker should make the municipality itself liable for a substantive
due process violation where that deliberate indifference causes consti-
tutional injury. In each case, the court should ask the "Where's the
beef?" question, forcing both advocates and the court to focus on the
case as either a Canton/Brown form of municipal liability for a non-
policymaker's constitutional violation or a Collins/Lewis form of di-
rect constitutional liability based on the subjective deliberate indiffer-
ence of a policymaker as the source of the constitutional injury. In
defining "the beef," litigants and lower courts must be cautious in the
framing of their arguments and opinions, respecting the distinction be-
tween the statutory standard and the constitutional standard of culpa-
bility in § 1983 cases.
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